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THE SNOWDEN REVELATIONS, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AND THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
U.S.-EU IN DATA PRIVACY PROTECTION 
Ioanna Tourkochoriti  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Snowden revelations took place in the midst of negotiations on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The first round of negotia-
tions took place on July 8th in Washington D.C. The Spiegel revealed that 
????????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ???????????1 
The French and German governments were reported to be outraged, with 
some parliamentarians calling for a suspension of the talks.2 The revelations 
are seen as a strong negotiating tool in the hands of the EU, as there is a 
significant difference in the protection of data privacy between Europe and 
the United States.3 The negotiations are currently through their sixth round.4 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership aims at enhancing 
trade in goods and services and at increasing investment between the United 
States and the European Union. If concluded, the scale and breadth of a 
U.S.-EU free trade agreement would be unprecedented, as the economic 
relationship between the U.S. and the EU is the largest in the world.5 Com-
bined, the EU and the U.S. account for approximately 40% of world GDP 
and 30% of world trade.6 The development of provisions to aid the use of 
 
  Wertheim Fellow, Labor and Worklife Program Harvard Law School. 
 1. Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Friends or Foes? Berlin Must 
Protect Germans from US Spying, THE SPIEGEL (July 1, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.spiegel. 
de/international/world/why-nsa-spying-program-must-be-independently-investigated-a-
908726.html. 
 2. Karen Hansen Kuhn, Trade Secrets?Draft EU Documents Reveal Trade Agenda 
with U.S., ABOUT EU-USA FREE TRADE & INVESTMENT DEAL, INFO. SHARING & 
COORDINATION TO STOP TRANSATLANTIC TRADE & INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (July 10, 2013, 
8:59 AM), http://transatlanticalternatives.wordpress.com. 
 3. NSA Leak Shrouds EU-U.S. Trade, Privacy Discussions, ARMA INT?L (July 24, 
2013), http://www.arma.org/r1/news/newswire/2013/07/24/nsa-leak-shrouds-eu-u.s.-trade-
privacy-discussions. 
 4. See Memorandum, European Commission, Ensuring transparency in EU-US trade 
talks: EU publishes negotiating positions in five more areas (May 14, 2014), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1076. 
 5. William H. Cooper, EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope and Magnitude, 
CONG. RES. SERVICE (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=735058. 
 6. Bilateral trade in goods and services between the two entities totals $2.7 billion 
daily. Additionally, $3.7 trillion has been invested in manufacturing facilities, real estate and 
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electronic commerce in support of trade in goods and services and the 
movement of cross-border data flows are among these elements of negotia-
tion.7 Electronic commerce represents 1???????????????????????????????????
most developed economies in the last fifteen years. In the United States 
alone, digital economy represents an estimated 30% of global Internet reve-
nues. According to estimates from the European Commission, over half of 
the EU-U.S. cross-border trade in services depends on the Internet.8 
Differences in data privacy and protection between the U.S. and EU 
have already arisen in the agenda.9 Senior European data privacy officials 
have placed preconditions on European participation which would include 
the United States adopting new privacy protections in multiple areas, includ-
ing the European Parliament rapporteur on the General Data Protection 
Regulation, Jan Philipp Albrecht, (Member of European Parliament) and 
???????????????al commissioner for data protection, Peter Schaar.10 These 
also include addressing inconsistencies in privacy regulations between U.S. 
states and expanding the coverage of data protection to sectors other than 
the ones already covered (e.g. healthcare).11 
Following the revelations, the European Commission made clear that 
the standards of data protection will not be part of the on-going negotiations 
for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,12 while the Committee 
 
other assets on both sides of the Atlantic. See Faegre Baker Daniels, M. Angella Castille, 
Paul Finlan, Robert J. Kabel & Bradley A. McKinney, Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) Overview, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/librar
y/detail.aspx?g=4eecd015-5098-4a01-839c-5e409bdc5d35. 
 7. Jeffrey S. Beckington, The United States and the European Union Prepare to Nego-
tiate a Trans-????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ????????, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 15, 
2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6eb0db95-bfa9-4ee2-80f2-972e8de27 
dc1. 
 8. See Commission Impact Assessment Report on the Future of EU-US Trade Rela-
tions, at 8 n.11, COM (2013) 136 final (March 12, 2013). 
 9. Eric Shimp, Data Privacy in the Transatlantic Trade Agreement? US-EU Ponder the 
Way Forward, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g= 
c5967083-4af2-4ba0-b4c2-f2ae1b4b9674. 
 10. Id. According to the declaration of Peter Schaar, Federal Commissioner for Data 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
trade agreement will not only raise economic growth but also advance the efforts for good 
data protection in the U.S. and in the European Union. Competitive devaluation at the ex-
????????? ?????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????Transatlantic Free 
Trade Zone? But Only When the U.S. Provide Improved Data Protection!, FED. 
COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION & FREEDOM OF INFO. (last visited Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/PublicRelations/SpeechesAndInterviews/blog/TransatlanticFree
TradeZone.html?nn=408870. 
 11. Shimp, supra note 9. 
 12. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ????e-
store Trust in EU-U.S. Data Flows (Nov. 27, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-1166_en.htm. 
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on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament insists that a separate agree-
ment on strong data privacy protections is necessary.13 The Commission 
refuses to negotiate data protection with the United States as in its opinion, 
?????????????????????????????????? is not negotiable.14 
The European Commission has submitted a proposal for a regulation 
that updates the privacy-law protection to strengthen the existing legal 
framework, which will increase the gap in data protection even further.15 EU 
officials have discussed the need to reform the current arrangement between 
the U.S. and EU16: the 2000 Safe Harbor Agreement.17 Commentators in the 
U.S. fear that the proposed EU regulation heightens certain individual rights 
beyond levels that U.S. information-privacy law recognizes and centralizes 
power in the European Commission in a way that destabilizes the current 
equilibrium.18 
The existing legal instrument in the European Union is the 1995 Data 
???????????????????????????????????19 which has had great practical impact in 
shaping other data privacy initiatives within the EU and has proven highly 
influential outside Europe as well, while also being highly contentious?
especially for American business interests.20 The contention derives from the 
???????????? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ????????? ????? ??? ???-
European countries that fail to provide adequate levels of data protection.21 
The fundamental differences between Europe and the United States in the 
approach to data-privacy regulation concern six distinct variances: their fun-
damental presumptions; their limits on contractual freedom; their coverage 
 
 13. See Draft Working Document on Foreign Policy Aspects of the Inquiry on Electronic 
Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens, at 3 (Apr. 11 2013), available at http://www.statewatch. 
org/news/2013/nov/ep-nsa-surv-inq-working-document-fa-committee.pdf. 
 14. ???????????? ????????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ??-US Data Flows?
Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 27, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1059_en.htm. 
 15. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf [here-
inafter Proposed Regulation]. 
 16. Andreas Geiger, EU Will Ramp Up Data Protection in Wake of Snowden, THE 
HILL?S CONGRESS BLOG (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/ 
foreign-policy/317061-eu-will-ramp-up-data-protection-in-wake-of-snowden-. 
 17. See Schaar, supra note 10. 
 18. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions 
and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1968 (2013). 
 19. Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 25 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
 20. See Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic Tension on Data Privacy 5 (Transworld Working 
Paper No. 19, 2013), available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/Transworld/TW_WP_19.pdf. 
 21. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 25. 
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of privacy protections; their difference in the weighing of values in conflict; 
their definitions of data protections; and their enforcing authorities. This 
article will consider each difference, the insight that can be gained in this 
U.S.-EU divergence, and how those differences affect the flow of data be-
tween the U.S. and the EU. 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE PROTECTION 
 As mentioned earlier, there are fundamental differences in the pro-
tection of privacy between the U.S. and the EU.22 This section analyzes the-
se differences in view of understanding what they mean for the transatlantic 
flow of data. 
A. The Fundamental Presumptions 
In the United States, the presumption is that processing of personal data 
is permitted unless it causes harm or is limited by law.23 The opposite pre-
sumption is dominant in the European Union where processing is prohibited 
unless there is a legal basis that allows it.24 In the same spirit, the European 
Court of Human Rights has held that the storage of personal data can consti-
tute an interference with the right to respect for private life under ECHR 
article 8(1) even if there is no evidence that the data was used to the detri-
ment of the data subject or even at all.25 
B. The Limits on Contractual Freedom 
The EU Directive places legislative limits on the ability to contract 
around data privacy rules.26 Although the Directive allows data processing 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????27 it does not al-
low a data subject to enter into an agreement that permits a data controller to 
derogate fundamentally from their basic duties on the basis of article 6 prin-
ciples relating to data quality28 and article 1229 concerning access rights of 
 
 22. See supra Part I. 
 23. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the 
United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6). 
 24. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at arts. 5, 6, 7. 
 25. See Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58497. 
 26. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 7. 
 27. Id. at art. 7(a), (b). 
 28. Id. ??? ????? ?? ???????????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ??o-
cessed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided 
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the data subject to the data.30 The Directive binds the states to outlaw the 
processing of special categor???? ??? ????????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ??????????
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership, and the processing data concerning health or sex 
?????31 with narrow exceptions.32 The proposed regulation extends the prohi-
bition to the processing of genetic data, of criminal convictions, and related 
security measures.33 Under the Directive, states may legislate that the con-
sent of the data subject does not lift the ban.34 This proposed regulation 
maintains relevant legislation in the Member States or enacted by the EU 
foreseeing such prohibitions.35 
The U.S. data protection regime affords contract and market mecha-
nisms greater latitude in setting data-privacy standards. It permits a signifi-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????-related interests of data 
subjects. 
 
that Member States provide appropriate safeguards; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive 
in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed; (d) accurate 
and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data 
which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were col-
lected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified; (e) kept in a form that 
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or for which they are further processed. Member States shall 
lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data stored for longer periods for historical, 
statistical or scientific use. 2. It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is com-
?????????????? 
 29. Id. ?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????l guarantee every data subject the 
right to obtain from the controller: (a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and without 
excessive delay or expense: - confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being 
processed and information at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of data 
concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are disclosed, - 
communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any 
available information as to their source, - knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic 
processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the automated decisions referred to 
in Article 15(1); (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing 
of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the 
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data; (c) notification to third parties to whom the data 
have been disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 30. See Bygrave, supra note 20, at 6. 
 31. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 8. 
 32. Id. at art. 8(2). 
 33. Proposed Regulation, supra note 15, at article 9(1). 
 34. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 8(2)(a). 
 35. Proposed Regulation, supra note 15, at art. 9(2)(a). 
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C. The Coverage of Protection 
The Directive is broad in scope and applies to the processing of per-
sonal data in both the private and public sectors. The protection afforded is 
wider in Europe: the EU regime is more restrictive as to the use of data.36 
Any processing of personal data must be fair to the individuals concerned. 
The principle of proportionality applies here as well, ????????????????????e-
quate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
???????????????37 The directive provides data subjects with a right to control 
the use of their personal data.38 Data subjects are to be informed about the 
entities that collect their personal information, how it will be used and to 
which third parties it will be transferred.39 Subjects have the right to verify 
the accuracy and the lawfulness of the processing, and to know the logic 
involved in the automatic processing of data that concerns them.40 Accord-
ing to the new regulation, the collection and processing of personal data 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????41 
In contrast, U.S. law contains only limited sector-specific protections 
for sensitive information.42 It does not generally restrict automated pro-
cessing. U.S. law allows companies to try new kinds of data processing. 
This promotes innovation but might lead to new ways to violate privacy.43 
The result of the sector-by-sector approach in the U.S. makes technology 
companies a powerful voice in favor of the regulatory status quo. The con-
sumer data privacy framework consists of industry best practices, FTC en-
forcement, and a network of chief privacy officers and other privacy profes-
sionals who develop privacy practices that adapt to changes in technology 
and business models and create a growing culture of privacy awareness 
within companies.44 
 
 36. See supra notes 28?29. 
 37. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at § 28. 
 38. See id. at arts. 7, 11, 14. 
 39. Id. at art. 11. 
 40. Id. § 41 (Considerations of trade secrets or intellectual property and copyright pro-
tecting software cannot result in the data subject being refused all information.). 
 41. Id. at art. 6(1)(b). 
 42. For a general presentation, see Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1974. 
 43. See id. at 1978. 
 44. See THE WHITE HOUSE, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Frame-
work for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (Feb. 
23, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [here-
inafter Consumer Data Privacy]. 
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D. The Difference in the Weighing of Values in Conflict 
When privacy conflicts with other rights such as freedom of expres-
sion, the balancing of European enforcement mechanisms (data-protection 
authorities and courts) weighs mostly in favor of protecting privacy.45 In the 
U.S., however, when privacy claims are weighed against First Amendment 
rights, most often the latter win out.46 Recently, the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a Vermont law that barred pharmacies from disclosing 
???????????? ??? ??????????????47 ??????????? ???????? ???????????-identifying 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????roduce reports on prescriber behavior and lease their reports 
to pharmaceutical manufacturers.48 ???????????????????????????????????????
manufacturers then use the reports to refine their marketing tactics and in-
crease sales to doctors.49 ?????????? ??????????on Confidentiality Law pro-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-identifying information 
may not be sold by pharmacies and similar entities, disclosed by those enti-
ties for marketing purposes, or used for marketing by pharmaceutical manu-
facturers.50 
For the Court, the law enacted a content- and speaker-based restriction 
on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information forbid-
ding sale subject to exceptions based in large part on the content of a pur-
????????????????? ??? ???n barred pharmacies from disclosing the information 
when recipient speakers will use that information for marketing. Finally, it 
prohibited pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information for 
marketing.51 
The statute disfavored marketing, i.e. speech with a particular content, 
as well as particular speakers, i.e. detailers engaged in marketing on behalf 
of pharmaceutical manufacturers, and is thus subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.52 For the Court, assuming that physicians have an interest in keep-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
serve that interest, as pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying infor-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
??????????????????????????????ns on nothing more than a difference of opin-
ion.53 
 
 45. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 46. See, e.g., Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, 574 F. Supp. 10, 14 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 47. See Sorrel v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011). 
 48. Id. at 2659?62. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 2660. 
 51. Id. at 2665. 
 52. Id. at 2666. 
 53. Sorrel, 131 S.Ct. at 2672. 
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This argument would not be popular in the European conception where 
a concept of privacy as articulated in different spheres that are not overlap-
ping is dominant. Revelation of one piece of information to one sphere does 
not necessarily mean that this information is public. Thus the state is legiti-
mized to limit specific disseminations of information available in one do-
main. Similar data in the European Context are considered sensitive as relat-
ing to medical privacy and thus under the scope of the EU Directive. 
E. The Definition of the Protected Data 
The European Union protects information that is identifiable to a per-
son, whereas the United States protects information that is actually liked to 
an identified person.54 ???? ??? ?????????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person . . . ; an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
??????????55 
The EU approach is over-inclusive, whereas the U.S. is under-
inclusive.56 This is because whether information can be re-identified de-
pends upon technology and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-
identified data with already identified data.57 As additional pieces of identi-
fied data become available, it becomes easier to link them to de-identified 
data because there are likely to be more data elements in common.58 
F. Enforcing Authorities 
In implementing the Directive, the EU member states have established 
independent authorities that monitor and enforce the data privacy laws.59 
Independent authorities are empowered to contribute to the consistent appli-
cation of the Directive throughout the Union.60 These authorities conduct 
investigations, either following a complaint by a data subject, or on their 
own initiative.61 They monitor relevant developments insofar as they have 
an impact on the protection of personal data.62 Data Controllers may process 
 
 54. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 5. 
 55. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 2(a). 
 56. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 18. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 28. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. at art. 28(3). 
 62. See id. 
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personal data once they have notified the relevant Data Protection Authori-
ty.63 They also approve corporate binding rules that are obligatory for the 
transfer of data abroad and participate in the activities of the European Data 
Protection Board. 
In the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been granted 
some of these same powers.64 During the last two decades the FTC has 
played an increased role in protecting privacy. There are, nevertheless, lim-
its on the scope of its activities. For example, it does not have jurisdiction 
over all companies,65 and its enforcement has not extended to even the nar-
row range of Fair Information Practices used in the United States.66 The 
??????? ????????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????67 The FTC has prompted the 
members of the online advertising industry to develop self-regulatory prin-
ciples based on Fair Information Practice Principles.68 The FTC has main-
tained that the use or dissemination of personal information in a manner 
contrary to a posted privacy policy is a deceptive practice under the FTC 
Act.69 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 199970 requires the FTC and other 
agencies to establish security standards for nonpublic personal infor-
mation.71 In the public sector in the U.S., seventy Inspectors General con-
duct, coordinate, and supervise audits and investigations of their respective 
agencies for issues concerning data privacy. Congressional Committees 
 
 63. See id. at art. 18. 
 64. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 65. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
telecommunications carriers and other types of entities. See id. § 45(a)(2). 
 66. Paul M. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1977?78. 
 67. FED. TRADE COMM?N, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic 
Marketplace: A Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress (May 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-
federal-trade-commission. 
 68. Jon Leibowitz, FED. TRADE COMM?N, Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behav-
ioral Advertising (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-
advertising/p085400behavadleibowitz.pdf. Fair Information Practices define the core obliga-
tions for public or private entities that process personal information. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & 
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 915?17 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 
2011). 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). 
 70. Id. §§ 6801?6809 (2006). 
 71. Id. § 6801(b). The FTC issued regulations according to which financial institutions 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????
ins??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???h-
nical, or physical safeguards you use to access, collect, distribute, process, protect, store, use, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. § 314.2(c) (2006). 
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have oversight role with respect to the executive branch, including privacy 
and data protection issues.72 
III. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE DIVERGENCE 
The difference in the data protection is profoundly a difference in the 
understanding of the role of the state. In Europe, the mission of the state is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????73 According to this conception, 
the state will assure that the citizens will have the necessary preconditions 
for the exercise of their liberty. This conception of the state often leads to 
paternalism and the negation of the individual to decide for herself. The 
possibility allowed by the Directive for statutory limitations of the right to 
contract out data protection reflects this philosophical attitude. This concep-
tion is motivated by the idea that there are inequalities of power within civil 
society and the state is legitimized to intervene in order to protect the most 
vulnerable. Data privacy regulation is an important element towards allow-
ing the individual to define for herself how she will realize her liberty. This 
conception can be summarized in the phrase from the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights?????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????
in an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may in-
volve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life 
????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ???????? ????????????74 
Privacy is understood as a right that extends beyond a negative interest in 
protecting secret information, to a positive right of personal development 
and information self-determination and affirmative obligations of the state to 
secure data protection interests effectively.75 
In the U.S., the reverse presumption is dominant: the state will inter-
vene to regulate only specific aspects of human activity. Privacy against the 
state is protected in its form of self-determination, in cases like abortion,76 
 
 72. See Solove & Schwartz, supra note 23. 
 73. See Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to Freedom of 
Religion in France and in the U.S.A., 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791, 809 (2012). 
 74. See X. & Y. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1985). The case 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
protection of personal data in a manner that ought not to leave any uncertainties for the gov-
ernmental actors. See Jari Råman, European Court of Human Rights: Failure to Take Effec-
tive Information Security Measures to Protect Sensitive Personal Data Violates Right to 
Privacy?I v. Finland, no. 20511/03, 17 July 2008, 24 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP., no. 6, 
562?64 (2008). 
 75. Nadezhda Purtova, Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relation-
ship to Privacy and Waiver of Data Protection Rights, 28 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 179, 179?98 
(2010). 
 76. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839?
40 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
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freedom against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment), and freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment). Privacy is pro-
tected in the U.S. in such a way that creates a sphere of inviolability con-
cerning personal decisions. In this sense, it conforms with the logic that the 
state must intervene within civil society as little as possible. This is poten-
tially why the state is not as willing to intervene in order to protect viola-
tions of informational privacy coming from within civil society, whether it 
is the press or other corporations handling data privacy. Informational priva-
cy is not considered to be a value with enough importance to be protected by 
violations coming within civil society.77 According to the conception domi-
nant in the U.S., the state will arbitrate differences and will intervene in or-
der to protect negative liberty, liberty against the state.78 
IV. WHERE THE DIFFERENCE AFFECTS THE FLOW OF DATA BETWEEN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
The disjunction between the U.S. and EU definitions raises problems 
regarding international transfers of personal data. There is a complex legal 
structure for judging the permissibility of these transfers under EU law.79 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????,????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????80 The deter-
mination of adequacy is made at the member state level by the supervisory 
authority, which is required to inform the European Commission.81 The 
Commission can also decide that a third country does not ensure an ade-
quate level of protection and block any transfer of data to this Country.82 
The ????????? ??????????? ???? ??????? ????? ?????????????? ????? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????83 
The directive already provides for the law of an EU state to apply outside 
the EU in certain circumstances?most notably where a data controller 
based outside the EU uses equipment located in the state to process personal 
 
 77. See Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Freedom of Expression and the Protection of Human 
Dignity and Privacy in the French Legal Order and the Legal Order of the United States: A 
Study on Two Different Constitutional Precomprehensions (Sept. 24, 2010) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) (on file with author). 
 78. See id. 
 79. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19, at art. 25, 26. 
 80. Id. at art. 25(1). 
 81. Id. at art. 25. 
 82. See id. at art. 25(3), (????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
other of cases where they consider that a third country does not ensure and adequate level of 
protection. . . . Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent any transfer of 
?????????????????????????? 
 83. Id. at art. 25(5). 
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data for purposes other than merely transmitting the data through that state.84 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????a-
privacy law, although it maintains servers in European Countries.85 As re-
cently as last year, the French Data Protection Supervising Authority issued 
a report stating that Google currently provides insufficient information to its 
users on its personal data processing operations, that it does not provide user 
control over the combination of data across its numerous services, and that it 
does not provide retention periods.86 
Generally, the EU does not consider the U.S. to provide adequate pri-
vacy protection.87 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
countries. Negotiations between the U.S. and EU have resulted in mecha-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Directive.88 The Safe Harbor, Model Contractual Clauses and Binding Cor-
porate Rules are some of these mechanisms.89 The Safe Harbor negotiated 
between the EU Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce went 
into effect in 2000.90 A member state does not need to make a prior approval 
of a data transfer to the U.S. To join the Safe Harbor, a company must self-
certify to the Department of Commerce that it has complied with the seven 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
adequacy standard.91 ??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
 
 84. Id. at art. 4(1)(c). 
 85. See Google: The Beginnings of a Dialog, ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY (Sept. 16, 
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/news/docs/pr_16_09_08_
en.pdf. In 2011, the U.S. FTC had found that Google was not abiding by the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor or other privacy programs. See id. 
 86. Press Release, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????, ?????????????
Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and Uncontrolled Combination of Data Across Ser-
vices, (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/otherdocument/files/2012/20121016_press_release_google_privacy_cnil_e
n.pdf. 
 87. See, e.g., Press Release, ????????? ??????, European Commission Calls on the 
U.S. to Restore Trust in EU-U.S. Data Flows, (Nov. 27, 2013), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1166_en.htm. 
 88. See U.S. DEP?T OF COM., Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp. 
 89. Lothar Determann, DETERMANN?S FIELD GUIDE TO INT?L DATA PRIVACY LAW 
COMPLIANCE 25?47 (2012). 
 90. See Commission Staff Working Document on the Adequacy of the Protection Provid-
ed by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related FAQs Issued by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (215) 7. The safe Harbor decision was taken following an opinion of 
Article 29 Working Party and an opinion of the Article 31 Committee delivered by a quali-
fied majority of Member States. In accordance with Council Decision 1999/468, the Safe 
Harbor Decision was subject to prior scrutiny by the European Parliament. See id. 
 91. See id. The Department of Commerce reviews Safe Harbor self-certifications and 
annual recertification submissions that it receives from companies to ensure that they include 
all the elements required and updates a list of companies that have filed self-certification 
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substantive standards are closer to the EU protection. U.S. federal agencies 
regulate and enforce these standards?most notably, the FTC. As a result, 
the FTC has found violations of this agreement by companies like Google92 
and Facebook.93 
The proposed regulation has been criticized as carrying a potential for 
????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????? ????? ???? ?? ??????? ??? ????????94 The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????95 should a num-
ber of conditions apply, and it elab???????????????????????????????????????n-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????96 The right to be for-
gotten is described as the right of data subjects to have their personal data 
erased and no longer processed, where the data is no longer necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise pro-
cessed, where data subjects have withdrawn their consent for processing, 
where subjects object to the processing of personal data, or where the pro-
cessing of their personal data otherwise does not comply with the Regula-
tion.97 As it stands, this means that at the complaint of a citizen of an EU 
 
letters. The FTC intervenes against unfair or deceptive practices, within its powers of con-
sumer protection according to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The FTC 
committed to review on a priority basis all referrals from EU Member State authorities. Id. 
 92. See In re Google Inc., No. 102-3136, 2011 WL 1321658, at *6 (F.T.C. March 30, 
2011). Google did not adhere to the US Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of Notice and Choice 
for using data for purposes different than the one the data subjects had consented to. Id. The 
settlement further requires Google to establish and maintain a comprehensive privacy pro-
gram and it requires that for the next 20 years, the company have audits conducted by inde-
pendent third parties every two years to assess its privacy and data protection practices. Id. 
 93. See In re Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3518628, at *21 (F.T.C. July 27, 
2012). Under the settlement, Facebook is barred from making misrepresentations about the 
privacy or secu????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ?f-
firmative express consent before enacting changes that override their privacy preferences; 
????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????? ?????????????????? ????
user has deleted his or her account; required to establish and maintain a comprehensive priva-
cy program in reference to new and existing products and services; and is required every two 
years for the next twenty years to obtain independent, third party audits certifying that it has a 
privacy program in place that meets or exceeds the requirements of the FTC order and to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Id. 
 94. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1994. 
 95. See Proposed Regulation, supra note 15??????????????????????????????????????????????
the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to them and the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 96. See id. at art. 7. 
 97. This right is particularly relevant when the data subject has given their consent as a 
child when not being fully aware of the risks involved by the processing and later wants to 
remove such personal data especially on the Internet. However, the further retention of the 
data should be allowed where it is necessary for historical, statistical and scientific research 
purposes, for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, for exercising the right of 
freedom of expression, when required by law or where there is a reason to restrict the pro-
cessing of the data instead of erasing them. See id. at § 53. 
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member state to the supervising Data Protection authority, this authority can 
order and enforce any processor for example to erase material that concerns 
them. The Court of Justice of the EU held recently that this enforcement can 
go as far as obliging Google to use filters that eliminate links in search re-
sults on a person that has opted for erasing their data.98 For the Court even 
the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????99 
Other measures that the new regulation imposes are the prior approval 
of supervising authority for any processing of personal data,100 the right to 
object to processing for marketing purposes,101 and the right not to be sub-
????? ??? ????????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?????????
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person or to analyze or predict 
???? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ??????????? ??????????
health personal preferences, reliability or behavior, e.g. for use in targeted 
ads.102 The Directive foresees as exceptions cases of public security, preven-
tion, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, in partic-
ular economic or financial interest.103 
The new regulation requires controllers and processors to implement 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of secu-
rity appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of 
the personal data to be protected.104 The regulation also allows for heavy 
administrative fines: up to five percent of the annual worldwide turnover to 
enterprises violating its clauses, in case of violation of the aforementioned 
rights.105 
There seems to be willingness towards conversion among EU and U.S. 
officials, as indicated in the joint statement issued in 2012 by Vivian 
Reding, the European Commission Vice-President, and John Bryson, then 
U.S. Secretary of Commerce, which expressed a commitment to creating 
mutual recognition frameworks that protect privacy.106 
 
 98. Case C-131/12,  Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 
2014 EUR-Lex 317 (May 13, 2014).  
 99. Id. § 28. 
 100. Proposed Regulation, supra note 15, at art. 34(1). 
 101. Id. at art. 19(2). 
 102. Id. at art. 20. 
 103. Id. at art. 21(1). 
 104. Id. at art. 30(1). 
 105. Id. ??? ????? ???? ???? ????????? ????????????? ???????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ????????
revelations, was for fines up to two percent of annual turnover. 
 106. ??????????????????????????????????-U.S. Joint Statement on Data Protection by 
European Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding and U.S. Secretary of Commerce John 
Bryson, (March 19, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-
192_en.htm. 
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???? ?????? ????????????????? ????????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???? ??
consumer privacy bill of rights.107 It contains a set of fair information prac-
tice principles to govern private-sector handling of personal data in com-
mercial contexts. The Fair Information Practice Principles go in some re-
spects further than previous U.S. elaborations of such principles. They in-
clude a new principle enti???????????????????????????consumers have a right 
to expect that companies will collect, use and disclose personal data in ways 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????108 
There is no provision about prohibiting profiling altogether, like the one 
existing in the EU regulation.109 According to the White Paper, the Obama 
administration plans to start a public dialogue with all parties towards elabo-
rating codes of conduct for the industry that the FTC will then enforce.110 
The U.S. prefers this solution, as it is more flexible, rather than enacting 
rigid legislation, which responds to the existing technology at the moment of 
enacting legislation and is not easily applicable to later technological ad-
vances.111 It will also enact legislation of a basic set of privacy rights 
throughout areas of the commercial sector not currently subject to specific 
Federal data privacy legislation.112 The FTC and state Attorneys General 
will have the authority to enforce the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.113 
The FTC will have the authority to review codes of conduct against the 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.114 
V. CONCLUSION 
The differences in the protection of privacy between the European Un-
ion and the United States indicate that informational privacy is not a value 
important enough to legitimize state intervention within civil society for its 
protection. Although there seems to be willingness for convergence, the 
profound differences, which reflect a more profound clash of values on the 
role of the state and its intervention within civil society, show that these 
efforts will be rather limited. Commentators note, however, that another 
important actor to influence the international standards in the field is China: 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
 
 107. See Consumer Data Privacy, supra note 44, at 9. 
 108. Id. at 15. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 29. 
 111. See id. at 29?30. 
 112. See id. at 35?37. 
 113. Consumer Data Privacy, supra note 44, at 35?36. 
 114. Id. at 37. 
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may be even greater coordination and convergence of EU and U.S. regulato-
ry policy in the field.115 
 
 115. Bygrave, supra note 20, at 13. 
